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The Holy and the Handicapped: An
Examination of the Different Applications
of the Reasonable-Accommodation
Clauses in Title VII and the ADA
ALAN D. SCHUCHMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Employment litigation is the fastest-growing area in federal civil litigation
today' in large part due to Title VI12 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA").3 These two landmark pieces of civil rights legislation are similar in
many ways. They share the same laudable goals: they provide protections
comparable in scope,4 they are applicable to the same entities, and they have
similar enforcement procedures.' However, there is one anomaly between the
two. Though both require that employers "reasonably accommodate" the needs
of employees or applicants to avoid discriminating on the basis of religion or
disability, the "reasonable accommodation" requirement is applied with markedly
different results in each act.
In TWA v. Hardison,6 for example, a Title VII religious-discrimination action,
the Supreme Court held that it would be an undue hardship for TWA to bear
more than de minimis costs to give an employee the day of his Sabbath off. The
Supreme Court rejected an accommodation allowing the employee to transfer to
a position that would not involve a conflict with his religious beliefs, costing the
airline only $150 for three months.7 In contrast, in Nelson v. Thornburgh,8 a
district court held that accommodations for three blind employees ranging in cost
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., 1993,
Northwestern University. I would like to thank Professor Dan Conkle for providing me with
the constitutional-law foundation, for sharing his expertise in the area of law and religion, for
his open-door policy, and for his indefatigable willingness to answer questions without which
this Note would not have been possible. This Note is dedicated to my family who stood by me
the many years it took to get here and who taught me in many ways that prejudice and
discrimination against anyone for any reason is deplorable.
I. See John J. Ross, The Employment Law Year in Review, 24 INST. ON EMPLOYMENT L.,
VOL. 1, at 7, 13-14 (1995).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
3. See Thomas D. Am, The Arizona Legislature Protecting Employment At-Will, ARIZ.
ATr'Y, Aug.-Sept. 1996, at 40, 40.
4. See Francis X. Dee, Employment Litigation in the 90's: The Impact of the 1990
Americans With Disabilities Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 4 LMIG. MGMT.
SUPERCOURSE 725, 727 (1993).
5. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, with id § 12117 (providing that its powers, remedies,
and procedures with regard to enforcement shall be the same as those of various other sections,
among them it § 2000e-5).
6. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
7. See id at 92 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8. 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984).
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from $18,000 to $34,000 would not result in undue hardship and were thus
required.9 These two cases vividly demonstrate the differing results of
"reasonable accommodation" analysis under the two acts.'
How and why are these semantically identical requirements different? This
Note attempts to answer that question. Part I looks at the statutes themselves.
Part II delves into the development of the differing accommodation standards.
Part III examines the potential reasons behind the differing applications of
"reasonable accommodation." Ultimately, this Note concludes that the Supreme
Court has misinterpreted the language and ignored the congressional intent
behind the reasonable-accommodation clause of Title VII. This Note does not
mean to suggest that "reasonable accommodation" under Title VII should be
enforced with the same vigor as under the ADA. It does suggest that the current
Supreme Court doctrine in Title VII religious-discrimination cases be rejected
by Congress through legislation returning Title VII's reasonable-accommodation
clause to its clear, originally intended meaning.
I. THE STATUTES
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII prohibits discrimination against employees or job applicants on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." It makes it unlawful for an
employer, 2 employment agency, or labor organization, "to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment," or "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee," based on the delineated prohibited bases. 3 The law allows, absent an
intent to discriminate, the use of bona fide occupational qualifications and bona
fide seniority or merit systems to permit appropriate deviations from the
9. See id at 375-76. Nelson was decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 701-797 (1994). However, because the ADA is based in large part upon the Rehabilitation
Act and its regulations, cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act are frequently used for
guidance in "distinguishing a reasonable accommodation verses [sic] one that creates an undue
hardship [under the ADA]." JAMEs G. FRRSON, EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES AcT 93 (1992); see also infra note 83 and accompanying text.
10. Lest it appear I am intentionally skewing the case law, I acknowledge there are many
cases under Title VII which resulted in accommodations being required, see, e.g., EEOC v.
Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988), and many cases under the ADA
which resulted in accommodations being denied, see, e.g., Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1318 (1997). However, the bulk of the
decisions support the reasoning and analysis as posited in this Note.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
12. The law basically applies to all private employers with more than 15 employees, but
excludes the federal government and tax-exempt private-membership clubs. See id § 2000e(b).
13. Id. § 2000e-2.
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restrictions discussed above.' 4 Of the five prohibited bases for discrimination, the
statute gives definitions or parameters for only two: sex and religion. The law
says, "[t]he term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business."'" The law does not include, however, definitions of "reasonable
accommodation" or "undue hardship."
B. The ADA
Perhaps reflecting greater wisdom gained through experience, Congress, when
drafting the ADA, utilized much greater specificity and detail than when it
drafted Title VII. The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against
qualified individuals 6 with a disability 7 in regard to job-application procedures
or any terms or conditions of a job already held." Discrimination under the
ADA includes not making a reasonable accommodation to the known physical
or mental limitations of such an employee or applicant, unless the employer can
show that the accommodation would create an undue hardship.' 9
The ADA lists a variety of steps that might be reasonable accommodations,
including: making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities; job restructuring; part-time or modified
work schedules; reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or modification
of equipment or devices; appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials, or policies; and the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters.2" An "undue hardship" is an action requiring significant
difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the following factors:
the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter; the
overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed
at such facility; and the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact
otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility; the
overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the
business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the
number, type, and location of its facilities; the type of operation or operations
of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of
the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or
14. See id. § 2000e-2(h).
15. Id. § 2000e(j).
16. The Act defines a "qualified individual" as one who with or without reasonable
accommodation can perform the essential functions of the job. See id. § 12111(8).
17. In its sweeping coverage the Act defines "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." Id.
§ 12102(2).
18. See id. § 12112(a).
19. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
20. Seeid. § 12111(9).
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fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered
entity.2
It is in these definitions of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship"
that the ADA's greater specificity, relative to Title VII, is manifested.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIFFERENT
ACCOMMODATION STANDARDS
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
As originally enacted, Title VII included no accommodation requirement. It
outlawed discrimination on the basis of religion but imposed no statutory duty
on employers to accommodate employees' religious beliefs.22
Two years after the law went into effect, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission") addressed the issue of accommodation
for the first time. The EEOC had received complaints raising the question
"whether it is discrimination on account of religion to discharge or to refuse to
hire a person whose religious observances require that he take time off during the
employer's regular work week."'23 In response, in its religious-discrimination
guidelines, the EEOC instituted the requirement that employers accommodate
employees' and applicants' religious needs so long as doing so would not create
a "serious inconvenience" to the employer's business."
The guidelines went on to create exceptions that all but swallowed the rule.
For example, an employer was entitled to establish a normal work week and paid
holidays generally applicable to all employees, "notwithstanding that this
schedule might not operate with uniformity in its effect upon the religious
observances of his employees."25 An employer could permit time off with or
without pay for religious holidays as long as he treated all religions with
"substantial similarity," but closing on one holiday in no way mandated allowing
time off for another.26 When an employer found it necessary to alter an
employee's schedule which previously did not cause a religious conflict, the
employer was not compelled to accommodate the employee if doing so would
cause "serious inconvenience to the conduct of his business or disproportionate
allocation of unfavorable work assignments to other employees."'2 The
Commission even went so far as to issue a caveat to employees and applicants:
"a job applicant or employee who accepted the job knowing or having reason to
believe that [normal work week and foreseeable overtime requirements] would
21. Id. § 12111(10).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (a)(1) (1967).
24. Id. § 1605.1(a)(2).
25. Id § 1605.1 (a)(3). The guidelines gave an example of this exception: "an employer who
is closed for business on Sunday does not discriminate merely because he requires that all his
employees be available for work on Saturday." Id.
26. Id. § 1605.1(b)(1).
27. Id. § 1605.1(b)(4).
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conflict with his religious obligations is not entitled to demand any alteration in
such requirements to accommodate his religious needs."2 Clearly, the EEOC's
first foray into establishing an accommodation requirement did not result in
much protection of religious liberties.
The following year, however, the EEOC released new guidelines taking a
stronger pro-employee position. The new guidelines again stated that an
employer had an obligation to accommodate the religious needs of current and
prospective employees, but this time the employer was obligated to make
"reasonable accommodations" where such were possible without creating an
"undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." '29 The EEOC did not
define "undue hardship," but instead gave only a single example of what might
constitute such a burden." The Commission went on to shift to the employer the
burden of proving that an undue hardship rendered the accommodation
unreasonable.3 Finally, the guidelines acknowledged that because of "the variety
of situations which arise due to the varied religious practices of the American
people," these cases would have to be reviewed individually to obtain an
equitable application of the new guidelines.32 This kind of ad hoc, fact-
determinative case review is still used today in religious-accommodation cases.
The EEOC's creation of an affirmative obligation to accommodate religious
needs gave rise to court battles over whether the EEOC had the power to add
such a duty to Title VII, which merely stated that it was illegal to discriminate on
the basis of religion. In 1970, in denying rehearing in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals
Co.,33 the Sixth Circuit stated:
Nowhere in the legislative history of the Act do we find any Congressional
intent to coerce or compel one person to accede to or accommodate the
religious beliefs of another. The requirement of accommodation to religious
beliefs is contained only in the EEOC Regulations, which in our judgment are
not consistent with the Act.3 4
28. Id. § 1605.1(b)(3).
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1968).
30. The guideline provided that an undue hardship "may exist where the employee's needed
work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially similar qualifications during
the period of absence of the Sabbath observer." Id.
31. See id. § 1605.1(c).
32. Id § 1605.1(d).
33. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
In Dewey, the plaintiff, who refused to work on Sundays, was allowed under the employer's
collective-bargaining agreement with the union to obtain his own substitute. He eventually
refused on religious grounds to even do that because he sincerely believed it was a sin to ask
someone else to work on Sunday. The district court ruled for the plaintiff. See Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969). The court of appeals held that
Dewey was not discharged because of discrimination but because of his violation of the
collective-bargaining agreement and work rules. See Dewey, 429 F.2d at 330. The court felt
that the defendant had made a sufficient accommodation in allowing the plaintiff to switch his
own shifts. See id. at 331.
34. Dewey, 429 F.2d at 334. The court also believed that it would raise serious
Establishment Clause issues for the Act to "compel an employer to accede to or accommodate
the religious beliefs of all of his employees." Id. The court went on to say that "[t]he
fundamental error of Dewey and the Amici Curiae is that they equate religious discrimination
1998]
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The Dewey decision was affirmed per curiam by an equally divided United States
Supreme Court.35
One month later a district court in Florida handed down its decision in Riley
v. Bendix Corp.,36 also rejecting the authority of the EEOC to impose an
accommodation requirement on employers. In ruling for the employer-the court
said:
We do not believe that the [EEOC] is vested with the authority of
determining the procedural question of burden of proof.... Aside from that
fact we feel it would be unreasonable and impractical to require the complex
American business structure to prove why it cannot gear itself to the "varied
religious practices of the American people."37
These two decisions arguably led Senator Jennings Randolph to introduce the
1972 amendment to Title VII.38 Senator Randolph's amendment tracked the
language of the EEOC's regulations, thus giving the force of law to the parts of
the guidelines the courts refused to recognize because the EEOC rather than
Congress had promulgated them.39 The amendment, which Congress passed and
which is now codified as subsection (j) of § 2000e, reads: "The term 'religion'
includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless
an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."4
Senator Randolph's speech on the floor of the Senate also gave the impression
that he thought, or at least hoped, the amendment would lead to different results
in cases like Dewey and Bendix in the future. He said:
[F]reedom from religious discrimination has been considered by most
Americans from the days of the Founding Fathers as one of the fundamental
rights of the people of the United States. Yet our courts have on occasion
determined that this freedom is nebulous, at least in some ways. So in
presenting this [amendment to Title VII], it is my desire ... to assure that
with failure to accommodate." Id. at 335. For further discussion of the Establishment Clause
issues see infra text accompanying notes 9 1-100.
35. See Dewey, 402 U.S. 689. The vote was four to four, with Justice Harlan not
participating in the decision. See id.
36. 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972). The plaintiff
was a Seventh Day Adventist who was terminated when he refused to work past sundown on
Fridays even though his new shift required it. The court found that because the shift assignment
applied equally to all foremen, "the plaintiff was discharged solely because of his refusal to
work the hours assigned to him and not as a result of any religious discrimination." Id. at 591.
37. Id. at 588-89 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(d) (1967)).
38. In the Congressional Record, Senator Randolph mentioned the Supreme Court dividing
equally on a Sabbath-and-job-discrimination question, mentioned court decisions "cloud[ing]
the matter," and had the Dewey and Bendix cases printed in the record. 118 CONG. RPc. 705-14
(1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
39. See supra text accompanying note 15.
40. 118 CONG. REc. 705 (emphasis added); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000ea) (1994). Note that the
italicized portions directly refute the Dewey and Bendix decisions concerning the EEOC
regulations.
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freedom from religious discrimination in the employment of workers is for all
time guaranteed by law."'
The Senator went on to say that "there has been a partial refusal at times on the
part of employers to hire or to continue in employment employees whose
religious practices rigidly require them to abstain from work in the nature of hire
on particular days."42 He then posited his belief that the same concepts of
freedom to believe and freedom to act that are found in the First Amendment
were intended to be protected by the inclusion of religion in Title VII. However,
Senator Randolph thought the courts "clouded the matter with some uncertainty"
by coming down on both sides of the issue. He hoped his amendment would
"resolve by legislation-and in a way.., originally intended by the Civil Rights
Act-that which the courts apparently have not resolved."43 He saw the
amendment as a return "to what the Founding Fathers intended," and a protection
of people's religious freedom and their "opportunity to earn a livelihood within
the American system.""
The problem with Senator Randolph's amendment was that it still did not
provide much guidance to employers or courts for determining what a
"reasonable accommodation" or an "undue hardship" was.4" Arguably, Senator
Randolph was not only aware of this but intended it. In a dialogue on the Senate
floor, the Senator acknowledged utilizing language that would allow flexibility
and discretion in the application of the amendment: "I have placed in the
language of the amendment, that there would be such flexibility, there would be
this approach of understanding, even perhaps of discretion, to a very real
degree.""' Senator Randolph believed that this discretionary approach would
work because "the employer and employee, are of an understanding frame of
mind and heart."47 They do not try to cause problems or conflicts but "are just
building upon conviction, and, hopefully, understanding and a desire to achieve
41. 118 CONG. REC. 705 (statement of Sen. Randolph).
42. Id. The Senator also called attention to some of these "religious sects" and estimated
their numbers in the work force to be over one million strong. Id
43. Id. at 705-06.
44. Id at 706.
45. See, e.g., TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 75 n.9 (1977) ("It is clear from the language
of§ 7010) that Congress intended to change [the result of the Bendix case] by requiring some
form of accommodation; but this tells us nothing about how much an employer must do to
satisfy its statutory obligation."); see also BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODAION INTHE WORKPLACE 37 (1987) ("[7010)] did not provide much guidance to
employers in making attempts at accommodation.").
46. 118 CoNG. REC. 706 (statement of Sen. Randolph). The acknowledgment was in
response to Senator Dominick's question:
It is hard to foresee far enough ahead so that each specific type of case can be
anticipated. Am I correct in understanding that the amendment allows flexibility
both to the EEOC and to its investigators to determine whether or not any
particular group of religious adherents are having their customary observance of
their religious activities unduly interfered with? In other words, flexibility is
provided so that someone could make a discretionary judgment on it?
Id (statement of Sen. Dominick).
47. Id (statement of Sen. Randolph).
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an adjustment. 4 The Senator believed that only in a very, very small percentage
of cases would this not be accomplished.49 Unfortunately, for the Senator and
his amendment, it was these very cases that went to the courts for interpretation
of the Senator's vague, discretionary language. The result was the dramatic
weakening of the amendment's accommodation obligation, a direction
inconsistent with the Senator's intent.
The first, and by far the most influential, decision to undercut the reasonable-
accommodation clause was rendered by the Supreme Court in TWA v.
Hardison. There the most damaging part of the Court's opinion held that to
make TWA expend more than a de minimis cost to give the plaintiff his Sabbath
off would be an undue hardship.5 Consequently, the Court rejected several
accommodations the court of appeals found reasonable, saying they would have
cost TWA "either in the form of lost efficiency in other jobs or higher wages."52
In setting this low de minimis threshold for establishing an undue hardship the
Court set a standard "that arguably ma[de] almost any hardship an undue one. 53
After the Hardison decision the EEOC held public hearings to respond to the
concerns and questions raised by the Court's ruling. The Commission considered
both written and oral testimony from approximately 150 witnesses. The witnesses
were members of many affected groups, including employers and employees,
religious and labor organizations, and state and federal government
representatives.' The Commission concluded after these hearings that there was
still a great deal of confusion concerning the extent of accommodation required,
that some religious practices were not being accommodated, and that employers
were basing accommodation efforts on anticipated concerns rather than actual
experiences or costs.5 As a result, the EEOC revised the guidelines it issued in
1967 "to clarify the obligation imposed by section 7010) to accommodate the
religious practices of employees and prospective employees." '56
The new guidelines attempted to provide greater guidance concerning what
constituted a reasonable accommodation and an undue hardship, and tried to
replace some of the requirement's bite lost after Hardison. The Commission now
considered a refusal to accommodate justified only when undue hardship would
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. 432 U.S. 63. In this case the plaintiff worked for TWA in a department that was crucial
to the airline's operations, and that needed to be staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The
plaintiff was discharged for refusing to work on Saturdays, his Sabbath. See discussion infra
part II.A for more comment and critique of this case.
51. See id. at 84.
52. Id. Among the rejected accommodations were allowing Hardison to work a four-day
week, utilizing supervisory or other personnel to replace him on the fifth day, and filling
Hardison's shift with other employees paid overtime wages for the shift. See id. at 76. The
overtime would have cost $150 for three months. See id. at 92 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, supra note 45, at 50.
54. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1605.2-.3 app. A (1996) (summarizing reasoning behind and history





result from "each available alternative method of accommodation." ' In cases
where more than one possible accommodation exists the Commission recognized
that certain alternatives might disadvantage one employee more than others.
Therefore, "when there is more than one means of accommodation which would
not cause undue hardship, the employer or labor organization must offer the
alternative which least disadvantages the individual."" The Commission went on
to say that it would consider "what constitutes 'more than a deminimis cost' with
due regard given to the identifiable cost in relation to the size and operating cost
of the employer, and the number of individuals who will in fact need a particular
accommodation."59 Unlike past versions of the guidelines, this revision included
many examples and suggestions concerning reasonable accommodations and
undue hardships.60 Thus, the EEOC was clearly trying to minimize the damage
done by the Hardison decision to Senator Randolph's amendment and the
EEOC's 1967 religious-discrimination guidelines.
Unfortunately, the vitality of the amendment and the EEOC's new guidelines
suffered another major blow when the Supreme Court decided Ansonia Board of
Education v. Philbrook.6' The Court held that neither the statute nor the
legislative history require an employer to accept a particular accommodation. 2
Thus, once an employer has reasonably accommodated an employee's needs,63
the statutory inquiry is at an end and the employer does not have to show that the
other desired accommodations would cause undue hardship.6 The Court thus
rejected the EEOC guideline requiring an employer to implement the
accommodation that least disadvantages the employee.65
That essentially brings us to the current state of the law regarding reasonable
accommodation of religious beliefs under Title VII. The EEOC has given up
battling the Supreme Court through its guidelines and has for the time being
accepted the Court's doctrine as it stands. An accommodation is not reasonable
and therefore not required if it will impose more than de minimis costs upon an
employer; and, once the employer has offered a reasonable accommodation, it
has fulfilled its obligation.
57. Id § 1605.2(c).
58. Id. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii).
59. Id § 1605.2(e)(1) (emphasis in original) (quoting TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84
(1977)).
60. See id. § 1605.2(d)-(e).
61. 479 U.S. 60 (1986). In this case, Philbrook claimed he had been discriminated against
on account of his religion because his employer refused to allow more than three days of paid
leave for religious purposes when his employer would allow it for secular reasons. Philbrook,
relying on the EEOC guidelines, suggested an accommodation which was rejected by the
employer and resulted in the litigation. See id. at 63-65.
62. See id. at 68.
63. In this case the Court found that the offer of additional unpaid days off was a reasonable
accommodation. See id. at 70.
64. See id at 68.
65. See id. at 69 n.6.
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B. The ADA
Whereas Title VII's reasonable-accommodation standard developed over a
period of years after its passage, that of the ADA was essentially already
developed and in place when the Act was passed. What the courts did to shape
and define Title VII, congressional hearings and drafting committees did to
develop the ADA.
The ADA was passed in response to the perceived need for "omnibus rights
legislation for individuals with disabilities."66 What legislation there was, in
particular the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,67 was seen as inadequate, with serious
gaps in its coverage .6 Thus, after attempting legislation during a number of
congressional sessions throughout the 1980s, Congress finally responded to the
"compelling need to establish a clear and comprehensive Federal prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of disability in the areas of employment in the private
sector" with the passage of the ADA.69
The ADA was drafted to overcome the Rehabilitation Act's limitations while
preserving its fundamental approach to disability discrimination.0 Thus, the
definitions and prohibitions of the ADA closely parallel those of the
Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations.7 Most importantly, the
Rehabilitation Act's concept of reasonable accommodation was incorporated into
the ADA."2 In so doing, Congress utilized the language of Title VII as it did
throughout the ADA, with the resulting definition of discrimination including the
failure to make a reasonable accommodation absent undue hardship."
However, the concern over what would constitute an undue hardship was one
of the hottest topics of debate surrounding the ADA during its consideration in
Congress. 4 Congress specifically rejected the de minimis standard of undue
66. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 330.
67. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994).
68. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314. For
instance, despite the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, both the percentage of disabled men
working full-time and the income of disabled workers dropped between 1980 and 1988. See
id. at 28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310.
69. Id. at 28, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310 (emphasis added). The fact that the
Rehabilitation Act was applicable only to federal-government employment was probably seen
as its greatest inadequacy and was thus a primary motivation for the ADA.
70. See Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning
of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans With Disabilities Act,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1425 (1991).
71. See ABIGAIL COOLEY MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DIScRIMINATION LAW § 4:01, at 2 (3d
ed. 1993).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994). The source of the reasonable-accommodation
requirement in the Rehabilitation Act was the implementing regulation which defined a
"qualified individual" as one who could perform the job with reasonable accommodation to
their disability. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(c) (1996).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(a); supra text accompanying note 19.




hardship as used in Title VII religion cases, and opted instead for a standard
mandating an accommodation unless it rose to the level of "requiring significant
difficulty or expense."75 Congress felt this was necessary because of the "crucial
role that reasonable accommodation plays in ensuring meaningful employment
opportunities for people with disabilities."76
Before settling on the "significant expense" threshold, Congress considered
several other alternative undue-hardship standards. The Act initially required
accommodation unless it would threaten the continued existence of the
employer's business77 In response to great protest from the business community,
that standard was discarded. Congress refused to enact as lenient a standard as
the business community wanted in part because it believed the business
community's fears regarding the costs of accommodation were misplaced! 8 The
House Judiciary Committee even rejected an amendment that would have limited
required accommodations to those costing no more than ten percent of the
employee's salary. The Committee felt it was inappropriate to set a ceiling
inasmuch as the desired intent was to establish a flexible approach like that
employed under the Rehabilitation Act.
79
In addition to requiring significant expense rather than de minimis cost,
Congress went on to enumerate and ultimately codify additional factors to be
considered in the undue-hardship determination. These factors added to the force
of the accommodation requirement. 0 What was not codified in the statute was
included by the EEOC in its implementing regulations and its interpretive
guidance on the ADA,"' issued one year before Title I of the ADA became
effective. Included were the requirement that employers pay for the portion of an
accommodation that does not cause an undue hardship; the suggestion of
accommodating by reallocating "nonessential" job functions to other employees;
and the allocation of primary consideration on choice of multiple possible
accommodations to the disabled employee8 2
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(A); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350.
76. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350.
77. See Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans With Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U. ILL.
L. REV. 923, 927.
78. A 1982 study found that only 22% of disabled workers required special
accommodation, and that of those, 51% imposed no cost and 30% cost less than $500 per
worker. See id. at 930.
79. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 41, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,464.
80. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
81. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 67-70, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
330, with 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)-(p), andid § 1630 app. (1996) (Interpretive Guidance on Title
I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, Section 1630.2(o), Reasonable Accommodation, and
Section 1630.2(p), Undue Hardship).
82. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)-(p); id § 1630 app. (Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the
Americans With Disabilities Act, Section 1630.2(o), Reasonable Accommodation, and Section
1630.2(p), Undue Hardship). As will become evident in Part III.A, similar requirements or
suggestions have been either rejected or the cause of great debate under the reasonable-
accommodation clause of Title VII.
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The EEOC also made it clear that "the standards applied in the ADA are not-
intended to be lesser than the standards applied under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973."' 3 The House and Senate committees in charge of examining and reporting
on the ADA also noted that the undue-hardship determination was "derived from
and should be applied consistently with interpretations by Federal agencies
applying the terms set forth in... the Rehabilitation Act of 1973."8 Thus, one
year before the Act even became effective, the statutory language, legislative
history and intent, EEOC regulations and guidance, and the adopted judicial and
agency interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act, all combined to establish, with
significant bite, the definition of reasonable accommodation in the ADA.
III. EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE REASONS FOR DIFFERENT
APPLICATIONS
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The possible reasons for the evisceration of Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation clause stem from a variety of sources: the Constitution, concerns
about reverse discrimination, societal notions of fairness, and even statistical
data. Yet, all the reasoning is either unsound or easily rebutted.
The magnitude, or lack thereof, of the religious-discrimination problem is a
possible reason for the continued weaker interpretation of Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation clause. While charges of religious discrimination have increased
more than 31% since 1990,"5 in 1995 they still made up only 2% of all EEOC
complaints. 6 The ADA, on the other hand, accounted for over 20% of all EEOC
complaints filed within two years of its passage! 7 Thus, it is quite possible that
there simply is not enough public concern over the availability of reasonable
accommodations for employees whose religious beliefs conflict with their
employers' expectations or requirements to motivate congressional action to
reverse the eviscerating case law through legislation.
Notwithstanding the statistical sparsity of religious-discrimination claims, it
is the goal of civil rights statutes to protect minorities-a task that should be
pursued whether that minority is a vocal one or not. Furthermore, the legislative
history of § 2000e(j) clearly acknowledges that the amendment will protect
"small denomination[s]" in their "opportunity to earn a livelihood within the
83. Id. § 1630 app. (Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, Section 1630.1(b) and (c), Applicability and Construction).
84. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 67, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 349; see S.
REP. No. 101-116, at36 (1989).
85. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Courts Wrestle With Religion in Worqlace, WALL ST. J., Oct.
10, 1995, atBl.
86. See L.M. Sixel, Suits Claim Religious Job Bias/Federal Agency Acts in 3 Cases,
HOUSTON CHRON., July 25, 1996, at 1.
87. See Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in
Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 12 n.42 (1996).
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American system."88 Many commentators have opined that the purpose of Title
VII's prohibition on religious discrimination is (or should be) to prevent
individuals from having to choose between their religion and their job.89 Thus,
there is no reason why the size of the problem should obscure the laudable goals
and detract from the enforcement of the reasonable-accommodation clause.
Another possible reason for the difference in force between the two
reasonable-accommodation requirements deserves mention but is well beyond the
scope of this Note. The actual and perceived differences between religion and
disability as grounds for protection from discrimination affect peoples' views on
this issue. By way of example, the ADA deals with discrimination based upon
characteristics beyond an individual's control. Religion, on the other hand, is not
perceived that way by many people. It can be argued that religion is the only
basis of discrimination included in Title VII that is alterable (ignoring sex-
change operations). On the other hand, it can be argued that its inclusion in that
group of bases indicates a congressional belief that it is not alterable or that
people either are or are not religious. These are among many important issues
that dramatically affect judges', lawmakers', and everyday citizens' convictions
about accommodation. But because they are obviously too rife with philosophical
and theological implications, they are beyond the pale of this discussion.
By far the most important consideration affecting the reasonable-
accommodation clause of Title VII is the Constitution. Anytime the government
takes any affirmative action in the name of religion, it is treading a thin line
between what is permissible and what is a violation of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause prohibits Congress from
passing a law respecting an establishment of religion, and from proscribing the
free exercise thereof.90 Establishment Clause challenges are reviewed by the
courts under a test first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.9 ' Under the Lemon test, the Court requires that a law have a primary
secular purpose; that it not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion; and that it not create an excessive entanglement between government
and religion.2 If a statute fails any one of the three requirements, it is
unconstitutional.
It is easy to see how a federal statute requiring private employers to
accommodate the needs of religious employees is mired in the concerns of the
Establishment Clause. Consequently, the Supreme Court and other courts have
expressed concern over the potential conflict between the Establishment Clause
and the enforcement of Title VII's reasonable-accommodation clause. Some
88. 118 CONG. REc. 706 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
89. See, e.g.,.Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, No. 95-C5371, 1996 WL 22964, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 12, 1996) ("It is nonsensical to suggest that an employee who, when forced by his
employer to choose between his job and his faith, . . . has not been the victim of religious
discrimination.").
90. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
91. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
92. See id. at 612-13.
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commentators have opined that the Supreme Court, in Hardison,93 chose to
utilize a very low standard for establishing an undue hardship in order to avoid
having to confront any Establishment Clause issues.94 Too strict of an
accommodation requirement could violate the Establishment Clause.
This was made clear by the Court in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,9s
decided after Hardison. There the Supreme Court ruled that a Connecticut statute
mandating that employees be given time off work for their chosen Sabbath was
in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court found problematic the
statute's "unyielding weighting" in favor of religion.96 Quoting Judge Learned
Hand, Chief Justice Burger wrote that "'The First Amendment... gives no one
the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their
conduct to his own religious necessities.' 97 Justice O'Connor, however, in a
concurring opinion, distinguished Title VII's accommodation requirement from
the Connecticut statute. O'Connor made specific mention of the fact that Title
VII calls for "reasonable rather than absolute accommodation." 98
Thus, it can be inferred that the Court would find constitutionally suspect any
application of Title VII's reasonable-accommodation clause which was too strict.
By setting a lower standard, the Court was able to avoid the question entirely in
Hardison. But did the Court have to go as low as it did? There certainly seems
to be a broad range of possible thresholds between absolute accommodation and
no accommodation upon showing de minimis costs, that would not violate the
Establishment Clause.
Absent an absolute-accommodation requirement, Title VII's religious-
discrimination provision appears to pass the Lemon test. Title VII has the secular
purpose of eliminating discrimination in the workplace based on a variety of
factors, not just religion. Although the courts and the EEOC may be involved, the
level of their entanglement does not seem to be.excessive. Finally, while the
accommodation of religious beliefs could be considered as advancing religion,
this is only an incidental effect of the statute. Title VII's primary effect is to
prohibit workplace discrimination and "ensure that religiously motivated
employees are given as much chance as possible to have the same employment
opportunities as employees who do not have religious barriers to employment."99
Thus, barring a requirement of absolute accommodation, or the provision of
"benefits that are so excessive they encourage employees to join a religion,"'00
93. TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (articulating a de minimis standard for purposes
of determining what constitutes an undue hardship).
94. See, e.g., BuREAu OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, supra note 45, at 50 ("Why did the Supreme
Court decide that any accommodation that would have greater than a de minimis cost would
constitute an undue hardship? It seems clear that the Court was trying to avoid the
constitutional issue in Hardison.").
95. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
96. Il at 710.
97. Id. (omission in original) (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61
(2d Cir. 1953)).
98. Id. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring).




a standard more protective of employees than the de minimis standard would not
seem to violate the Establishment Clause. The Court could have measured undue
hardship against a reasonable-costs standard or arguably even against a
significant-expense standard, like that of the ADA, and still met the requirements
of the Lemon test.
Closely related to (and possibly hopelessly intertwined with) the Establishment
Clause issues is the concern that to accommodate one's religious beliefs is to
discriminate against another's. This too was a driving force behind the Supreme
Court's decision in Hardison.' It appears as a concern in many other courts'
opinions as well.' It also is arguably the cause of the greatest workplace discord
surrounding the accommodation issue.
In deciding Hardison, the majority placed great importance on what it
perceived to be the discriminatory effect of religious accommodation. Justice
White, writing for the Court, said "to require TWA to bear additional costs when
no such costs are incurred to give other employees the days off that they want
would involve unequal treatment of employees on the basis of their religion."'"°
Because Title VII prohibits discrimination against majorities as well as
minorities, Justice White said "[i]t would be anomalous to conclude that by
'reasonable accommodation' Congress meant that an employer must deny the
shift and job preference of some employees ... in order to accommodate or
prefer the religious needs of others."'O He concluded by stating, "In the absence
of clear statutory language or legislative history to the contrary, we will not
readily construe the statute to require an employer to discriminate against some
employees in order to enable others to observe their Sabbath."' 5
Justice White's concluding statement, although dicta, reveals that the Court
seemingly would allow an employer to discriminate against an employee to
enable a religious employee to observe his Sabbath if the statute or its history
supported such a requirement. If this is the case then clearly such an action
cannot be unconstitutional.
However, in the subsequent Thornton case, the Supreme Court, again in dicta,
seemed to express a greater concern regarding the constitutionality of
accommodating one employee's religious needs at the expense of another's
secular needs. Chief Justice Burger, in a footnote, wrote:
101. TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
102. See BUREAUOFNAT'L AFFAIRS, supra note 45, at 70 ("The accommodation requirement
does not refer to other employees as a source of undue hardship, but a judicial consensus
appears to have emerged after Hardison that a proposed accommodation would be an undue
hardship if it comes at the expense of other employees."); see also EEOC v. Ithaca Indus., Inc.,
829 F.2d 519 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that Title VII does not require employer to discriminate
against some employees so others can observe their Sabbath); Ka Nam Kuan v. City of
Chicago, 563 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding employee had cause of action for reverse
discrimination due to accommodation of other religious employees); EEOC Decision No. 86-1,
40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1873 (Nov. 18, 1985) (holding that employer need not alter
work schedules if change would require other employees to work more Saturdays than under
previous schedule).
103. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 81.
105. Id at 85.
19981
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
[The statute in question] gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to
designate a particular weekly day off-typically a weekend day, widely prized
as a day off. Other employees who have strong and legitimate, but non-
religious reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the
statute. For example, those employees who have earned the privilege through
seniority to have weekend days off may be forced to surrender this privilege
to the Sabbath observer; years of service and payment of "dues" at the
workplace simply cannot compete with the Sabbath observer's absolute right
under the statute. Similarly, those employees who would like a weekend day
off, because that is the only day their spouses are also not working, must take
a back seat to the Sabbath observer." 6
The Court objected to the absolute nature of the statute which allowed for no
exceptions even when the "employer's compliance would require the imposition
of significant burdens on other employees required to work in place of the
Sabbath observers."'0 7 Thus, in part due to these concerns the Court held that this
"unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests"
established that the statute had the impermissible effect of advancing a particular
religious practice.'
Unfortunately, the Court's reasoning in Thornton seems closer to grade-school
notions of fairness than to scholarly constitutional analysis. Basically, the
question asked is "whether the right to be free from work on Saturday so as to be
able to wash the car or go on a picnic is entitled to the same constitutional
protection as the right to practice the religious belief that one should not work on
that day."'0 9 The Bureau of National Affairs's handbook on religious
accommodation in the workplace poses a useful hypothetical to make its point:
Suppose, for example, that a religiously motivated employee is allowed to
swap shifts while other employees cannot do so for non-religious reasons.
Are the other employees placed in a position that is worse than the position
they would be in if the religiously motivated employee were not allowed to
swap shifts? No. Instead, they are merely deprived of a benefit extended to
him that allows him to continue to work for the employer."0
It is true that if a nonreligious employee is forced to work on a Saturday to allow
a religious employee his Sabbath off, the nonreligious employee is disadvantaged
if she too wanted that day off. However, if the nonreligious employee has no
legal right to a full weekend, and if she is being paid her usual wage, "it does not
appear that the substituting employee has a complaint of the sort that the courts
are required to uphold. In due process terms, she does not appear to have been
deprived of a property right.' Thus, for a court to base an accommodation
decision on the impact the accommodation has on other employees seems to rely
more on notions of fairness than on constitutional analysis.
Notwithstanding the Thornton dicta, at the time the Court rendered its
Hardison decision the majority's sentiment seemed to be that such an action was
106. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 n.9 (1985).
107. Id. at 710.
108. Id.
109. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, supra note 45, at 52.




not unconstitutional. Therefore, the statutory language and legislative intent
should have been controlling on the meaning and interpretation of the
reasonable-accommodation requirement. Although Justice White found it
lacking, there was statutory language and legislative history the Hardison Court
could have relied on in setting its standard-that of the 1972 amendment, §
701(j)."2 Section 701(j), or 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) as codified, says that
accommodation is required if it will not impose an undue hardship on the
employer."1 In setting the de minimis standard, the Court essentially established
that accommodation is not required if it will impose minimum hardship on the
employer. In so doing the Court seems to have "read the adjective 'undue' out
of the Act." 4 Likewise, the Court ignored the same language in the 1967 EEOC
guidelines." 5 Thus, a very colorable argument can be made that in Hardison and
subsequent cases, " 6 the Court ignored congressional intent by establishing and
maintaining a standard that excuses employers from their lawful duty to
accommodate when the resulting hardship is less than undue. "
7
The legislative history of the 1972 amendment also suggests a stricter standard
was desired than the Court created. In his dissent Justice Marshall criticized the
majority's decision and accused it of being "almost oblivious of the legislative
history of the 1972 amendments of Title VI.""' He went on to review the
legislative history, focusing on Senator Randolph's desire to overturn through
legislation the Bendix and Dewey decisions which Marshall said "refused to
equate 'religious discrimination with failure to accommodate."' 9 The purpose
of the amendment, Marshall said, was to "make clear that Title VII requires
religious accommodation, even though unequal treatment would result."'"2
Although the legislative history contains only two pages of debate, there is
further evidence of contemplation of a stricter standard contained therein.
Senator Dominick asked Senator Randolph if the amendment would require an
employer to change an employee's schedule from fifteen days on and then fifteen
off, to a customary five- or six-day work week so that the employee could
112. Although § 701(j), see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994), was not actually before the Court
in Hardison (the case was based on the 1967 EEOC guidelines), the 1972 amendment was
relied on to justify "accepting the [1967 guidelines] as a defensible construction of the pre-
1972 statute." TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 77 (1977). Thus, it could also have been used
to provide the "clear statutory language and legislative history to the contrary" that the majority
said was lacking. Id. at 85.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
114. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, supra note 45, at 42.
115. Of course, EEOC guidelines are entitled to less deference than congressional statutes.
116. The Court could have addressed the language and legislative history of § 701(j) in
subsequent cases, such asAnsonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986), if it
felt restrained from doing so in Hardison.
117. Justice Marshall, in his Hardison dissent, went so far as to say, "The Court today, in
rejecting any accommodation that involves preferential treatment, [acts] in direct contravention
of congressional intent." Hardison, 432 U.S. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. Id at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d
324, 335 (6th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971)).
120. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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observe his Sabbath. Senator Randolph said that he did not "believe that an
undue hardship would come to such an employer."'' Yet, under the Court's
interpretation one could easily imagine such a request for accommodation being
found to impose an undue hardship because "the privilege of having [certain days
off] would be allocated according to religious beliefs."'"
Justice Marshall's dissent addresses this point very well in saying that "if an
accommodation can be rejected simply because it involves preferential treatment,
then the regulation and the statute, while brimming with 'sound and fury,'
ultimately 'signif[y] nothing.""' Marshall went on to explain that what all cases
of accommodation have in common is that an employee could comply with a
generally applicable, neutral rule only by violating his or her religious beliefs.
The accommodation question is whether the employee will be exempted from the
rule's demands; yet, doing so "will always result in a privilege being 'allocated
according to religious beliefs."" 24 However, Marshall concluded, this is what
Title VII requires unless undue hardship would result. " Yet, the Court's opinion
in Hardison has been interpreted by some lower courts to mean that any cost to
an employer greater than de minimis, even if expended voluntarily, is
discrimination against the other employees. 26
B. The ADA
Unlike Title VII, one need not delve into legislative history or analyze
numerous court decisions to discover the reasons for the exacting reasonable-
accommodation standard in the ADA. 2 7 The ADA begins with a section, entitled
"Findings and purpose," that plainly spells out the motivations behind and the
purpose of the Act. 21 Congress was concerned with the growing number of
disabled people in this country who had long been subject to various forms of
discrimination in critical areas and who did not have the benefit of any legal
recourse. 29 This continuing discrimination relegated disabled individuals to an
121. 118 CONG. REc. 706 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
122. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 85.
123. Id. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
124. Id. at 88 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 84 (majority opinion)).
125. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126. See, e.g., Nottleson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445, 451 (7th
Cir. 1981) ("[A]nything more than a de minimis cost would result in discrimination against
other employees."); KaNam Kuan v. City of Chicago, 563 F. Supp. 255, 258 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
("[W]hen an employer bears more than a de minimis cost to accommodate a religious belief,
it in effect discriminates against its other employees."); see also Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr.
Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239,
1243 (9th Cir. 1981); Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 961-62 (8th Cir. 1979);
Bums v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1978).
127. Although if one did so, there are extensive reports, testimony of hundreds of witnesses,
polls, and congressional findings, all supporting the need for this legislation. See, e.g., H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 4, at 28-29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 517-18; S. REP.
No. 101-116 (1989).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
129. See id.; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6.
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inferior position in society, and cost the nation billions of dollars in expenses due
to dependency and nonproductivity. 3 ° Congress was also concerned that the
discrimination was "based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such
individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
individual ability of such individuals.'..
In the Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources on the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1989, the Summary of the Legislation begins:
The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to
bring persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of
American life; to provide enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities, and to ensure that the Federal
government plays a central role in enforcing these standards on behalf of
individuals with disabilities.12
Congress knew that it was passing legislation that was landmark in its scope and
import. The ADA has been called "the most far-reaching discrimination measure
enacted in the last 20 years," and was predicted to "radically alter the
employment picture" upon becoming effective.' To make any sort of impact
upon the problem of discrimination against disabled people, the Act's
reasonable-accommodation requirement would have to be exacting.
CONCLUSION
Clearly there is a congressionally recognized and intended difference between
the reasonable-accommodation clauses of Title VII and the ADA. Although
Congress had less to do with the current interpretation of Title VII's
accommodation requirement than did the courts, it has not redefined the clause
through legislation; thus it has impliedly accepted it. This is unfortunate because
the Supreme Court has misinterpreted the clause, and ignored the original intent
behind it.
Because the problem of discrimination against disabled people was, by
congressional accounts, more severe both numerically and otherwise than that of
discrimination against religion, it is arguably worthy of greater attention and
enforcement support. Whereas the accommodation requirement of the ADA
opens the workplace to millions of workers who otherwise would be unable to
work, Title VII can be seen as simply conferring privileges on employees already
in the workplace.
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101; S.REP.No. 101-116, at9.
According to [a] Lou Harris poll, the majority of those individuals with
disabilities not working and out of the labor force, must depend on insurance
payments or government benefits for support. Eighty-two percent of people with
disabilities said they would give up their government benefits in favor of a full-
time job.
131.42 U.S.C. § 12101(7); see also S. REP.No. 101-116, at 15.
132. S. REP.No. 101-116, at2.
133. ALAN M. KoRAL & BRUCE MCLANAHAN, EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILrIEs ACT 9-10 (1990).
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Nonetheless, discrimination in any form is invidious, and thus to force sincere
religious believers to choose between their beliefs and practices and a particular
job seems to be creating choices and situations of the very nature that Title VII,
and in particular subsection (j) of § 2000e, was enacted to prevent.'3 4 Of course
there are competing interests, such as those of the business owners, to be
considered. Surely a balance could be achieved between the business
community's concerns over costs and control of their businesses and the
Hobson's choice facing many religious believers.
I believe the answer lies somewhere between the de minimis and significant-
expense thresholds, with a focus on many pertinent factors like that of the
ADA. '3 Would it truly work an undue hardship on the United Parcel Service to
allow an employee to wear a beard when his religious beliefs prohibit him from
shaving?'36 Is it an undue hardship for a large company like TWA to pay $150
to accommodate an employee for three months? And what of the employee who
refuses to work on her Sabbath-is it an undue hardship to require another
employee to forego a football Sunday or a picnic to make it possible for her to
observe her beliefs and keep her job? The legal answer to these questions before
the Supreme Court eviscerated the 1972 amendment to Title VII was "no."
A new amendment to Title VII is needed: one that makes clear that employers
may have to expend more than de minimis costs to ensure that Title VII's goal
of eradicating workplace discrimination does not overlook religious
discrimination; one that makes it clear that less import and consideration will be
given to the effect an accommodation has on other employees whose only
complaint is, "that's not fair." A properly drafted amendment can avoid
Establishment Clause problems by not requiring absolute accommodation and by
not requiring so much of employers that the courts become too entangled in the
management of businesses. Likewise, due process concerns can be avoided by
not infringing upon the .contractual rights of other employees when making a
reasonable accommodation. A good starting point would be a repudiation of the
current Supreme Court doctrine and a return to Senator Randolph's intended
law.' 7 Under his law, using an ad hoc, case-by-case determination, an employer
would have to provide reasonable accommodations unless they would pose
undue hardship upon the business.
134. When he introduced his amendment Senator Randolph stated, "This amendment is
intended, in good purpose, to resolve by legislation-and in a way I think was originally
intended by the Civil Rights Act-that which the courts apparently have not resolved." 118
CONG. REc. 705-06 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph). Senator Randolph was concerned
that the courts were not interpreting the term "religion," as used in the Civil Rights Act, as
Congress intended. He believed "[t]he term 'religion' as used in the Civil Rights Act of 1964
encompasses, as I understand it, the same concepts as are included in the First
amendment-not merely belief, but also conduct; the Freedom to believe, and also the Freedom
to act." Id. at 705.
135. See supra text accompanying note 21.
136. See EEOC v. United Parcel Sere., 94 F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1996).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
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